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To read full article: https://carnegieeurope /2024/02/28/understanding-energy-drivers-of-turkey-s-foreign-policy-pub-91733
This chapter is part of a report on the prospects for enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Western countries in the Black Sea region in the new geopolitical setting following Russia''s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Understanding the evolution of the European natural gas strategy provides important context for Turkey''s ongoing ties with EU nations, especially given the direct implications for EU gas supplies following Russia''s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to Russia''s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU relied heavily on Russian natural gas, representing 40 percent of imports,1"Share of Russian Gas in EU Natural Gas Imports 2021," Statista, n.d., https://, accessed July 10, 2024. or 150 billion cubic meters (bcm), in 2020.
In line with the ongoing high investments in LNG infrastructure, the EU increased its LNG import capacity by 40 bcm in 2023, with plans to add another 30 bcm by 2024,7"Liquefied Natural Gas," European Commission, January 2024,https://energy.ec ropa /topics/carbon-management-and-fossil-fuels/liquefied-natural-gas_en. though this infrastructure is still under construction. The share of LNG in the EU''s gas supply rose from 20 percent in 2021 to 41 percent in 2023, reflecting a radical diversification of energy sources in response to the conflict in Ukraine.
Importantly, while the EU continues to purchase Russian LNG via Novatek, the fourteenth sanction package,8"EU Reaches Milestone Agreement on Energy Policy," European Commission, June 24, 2024, https://ec ropa /commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3423. which was established in June 2024, fully prohibits all forms of reexport agreements. This measure will prevent Russian LNG carriers from utilizing the EU''s developed LNG infrastructure in the near future.
Finally, the majority of the EU''s dependence on Russian gas was based on long-term natural gas pipelines. Notably, historical pipeline agreements, such as the Gazprom-Naftogaz deal, allowed Russian gas transit through Ukraine. This $7 billion agreement9Simon Pirani, "The Russia-Ukraine Gas Transit Deal: What''s at Stake?" Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2020, https:// aimed to transit 225 bcm from 2020 to 2024. Post-invasion reductions led Naftogaz to seek international arbitration against Gazprom, and the collaboration will no longer exist after 2024.
In October 2021, the European Commission introduced a comprehensive "toolbox"11"A Toolbox for Action and Support," European Commission, October 2021. designed to help EU member states address rising energy prices and bolster energy supply security by reducing dependence on Russian natural gas. Key measures included enhancing gas storage efficiency, establishing a collective gas purchasing platform, and reassessing the EU''s electricity market with the support of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).
In April 2022, the EU launched the EU Energy Platform12"Briefing: The European Green Deal,"European Parliament, July 11, 2023, https://(2023)751411. to focus on demand aggregation, joint purchasing of non-Russian gas, efficient use of natural gas infrastructure, and extensive international outreach. This platform aims to mitigate intra-EU competition, diversify supply chains, and reduce reliance on Russian energy sources in a coordinated and multilateral manner.
During this period, Germany faced two significant political-economic challenges in its dealings with Russia. First, the USSR engaged in barter trade, exchanging natural gas for steel pipes, pipe-laying equipment, and other related infrastructure materials with Germany via its companies. Second, Germany leveraged its robust domestic iron and steel sectors to secure cheap Russian natural gas, which it then sold to its European allies.
This approach greatly expanded Germany''s economic reach and indirectly subsidized gas prices for other European countries by maintaining dependence on Russia as the primary natural gas source. A similar mindset prevailed in many Germany-Russia natural gas projects—until Russia''s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted a significant shift.
In reaction to escalating energy security concerns, Germany has accelerated its diversification efforts by investing in LNG infrastructure, notably acquiring four floating LNG storage and liquefaction facilities aggregate, Europe''s LNG investment is poised for considerable expansion. Currently, there are thirty-seven operational import terminals:20"European LNG Tracker," Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, February 2024, https://ieefa /european-lng-tracker. eight newly commissioned, four expanded in 2022 and 2023, thirteen new terminal projects under construction, and four existing facilities with planned expansions.
Within the transatlantic community, Turkey, much like Germany, has faced criticism for its reliance on Russia. Nonetheless, Turkey and Germany, as NATO allies, exhibit starkly divergent strategies in their approaches to natural gas procurement and energy security. Reflecting Turkey''s balancing act in its natural gas policy, Ankara has historically pursued a multidimensional foreign policy that is sensitive to price fluctuations and geopolitical shifts from the Black Sea to Europe.
Turkey''s natural gas procurement history contrasts strongly with Germany''s energy policy, which has been centered on Russian natural gas and offered limited alternatives like LNG infrastructure. Germany''s dependence was highlighted during Russia''s irredentist moves in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, and lastly, Russia''s invasion of Ukraine, delineating the vulnerabilities inherent in this reliance. Germany''s turning point came quite late, in 2022, when it implemented the EU Toolbox, REPowerEU, and the Green Deal to diversify its energy sources and develop LNG capabilities.
Amid the varied landscape of energy strategies, it is essential to underscore that Turkey distinctly avoided the trade of strategic equipment, such as Germany''s pipe-for-gas strategy, which set the stage for advancing Russian influence in Europe through its pipelines and storage facilities. For more than fifty years, Turkey''s multidimensional approach has been a cornerstone of state policy, beginning with engagement with international markets in the 1980s. This strategy effectively melds considerations of price rationality and ongoing geopolitical risk assessment, integrating them in the foreign-policymaking process through a meticulously managed balancing act. (See Part 1 for more on diplomacy and dialogue.)
In line with this balancing act, Turkey expanded its LNG import capabilities and infrastructure, demonstrating a proactive and versatile approach that has been adaptable to price volatility since the first day of its natural gas procurement. This multidimensional strategy has always ensured flexibility and security in its energy supplyand underlinedTurkey''s aim of diversifying its energy sources without becoming dependent on fixed infrastructural ties, the dangers of which can be seen in Germany''s delayed response to diversifying away from Russian natural gas infrastructure.
Prompted by geopolitical tensions originating in Syria after Turkey downed an SU-24 type Russian jet in 2015,26"Syria: The Story of the Conflict," BBC News,December 1, 2015, https:// a critical reassessment of the nation''s substantial reliance on Russian gas, which had previously constituted over 50 percent of its total gas imports, became a focal point of Turkish foreign policy.
This strategic reconsideration sparked a vigorous public and governmental debate, which in turn accelerated significant investments in Turkey''s LNG import infrastructure. In this vein, the transmission capacity of Turkey''s natural gas networks has expanded, with current daily gas entry capacity exceeding four hundred thousand cubic meters (mcm) daily. Turkey is actively working to increase its natural gas storage capacity to at least 20 percent of its annual consumption.
Since 2015, Turkey has decisively shifted away from an overdependence on Russian gas. Nonetheless, the implications of Turkey''s balancing act in natural gas contracts may vary in response to price fluctuations and geopolitical assessments, as can be observed in the comparative supply strategies between 2020-21 and 2021-23.
Turkey''s development of its LNG infrastructure facilitates the implementation of its balancing act in natural gas contracts, enabling it to sign LNG contracts along with pipelines. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic between 2020 and 2021, Turkey''s approach to securing its natural gas needs via LNG contracts was notably a consequence of its traditional policy of price rationality. In accordance with that policy, Turkey positioned itself as the fourth-largest LNG importer in Europe with an increase of 1.3 million metric tons in 2020.29Anadolu Agency, "Turkey Ranks 3rd Worldwide with LNG Import Rises in 2020," Hürriyet Daily News, May 1, 2021, https://
This positioning entailed a shift toward spot market purchases rather than long-term commitments, as global gas prices plummeted due to decreased demand on production cycles. During that time of pandemic lockdowns, Turkey capitalized on these lower prices to enhance its energy security without binding itself to long-term agreements. The flexibility of relying on spot market LNG allowed Turkey to manage its energy costs effectively during a period of high economic and global uncertainty.
From 2021 to 2023, Turkey shifted its natural gas procurement strategy, increasingly favoring contracts through pipelines with suppliers like Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. In 2022, the total volume of natural gas imports to Turkey reached 54.66 bcm, with a substantial 72.25 percent being transported via pipelines.30"Turkey: Oil and Gas Equipment: LNG and LNG Terminals, Upstream and Downstream," International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce, January 6, 2024,https:// This reflects a strong preference for pipeline-based deliveries over LNG, which accounted for only 27.75 percent of imported natural gas.
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